Federal Court Cour fédérale

Date: 20250428

Docket: IMM-23001-24

Citation: 2025 FC 1060

Ottawa, Ontario, April 28, 2025

PRESENT: Associate Judge Catharine Moore

BETWEEN:

WAEL MOSTAFA ALY HUSSEIN
REHAB MOHAMMED ABDELRAHIM ABDELAZEZ
LINA WAEL MOSTAFA ALY HUSSEIN

Applicants

and

THE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP

Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

[1] Before the Court are two motions; however, as they deal with largely the same factual circumstances, I will address them both at the same time.

[2] The Applicants bring these motions in writing for an Order:

1. Admitting new evidence in the form of:

   a. A certified document from an Egyptian court confirming an ongoing investigation into one of the Applicants.

b. An affidavit explaining why the document was not available at the time of the proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) and the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD);

2. An extension of time to file the Application Record which was delayed due to exceptional circumstances.

[3] The Applicants also seek an Order quashing the RAD's decision and remitting the matter for reconsideration; however, that is the subject of the underlying application for judicial review and cannot be determined on motion.

[4] I will deal first with the motion relating to the new evidence.

[5] The Applicants rely on the Affidavit of Wael Mostafa Aly Hussein, who deposes that:

1. The new evidence consists of a certified document issued by the Asyut II District Court in Egypt on November 25, 2024, confirming that he is under investigation for alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization designated as a terrorist group by the Egyptian government.

2. The document is relevant and highly material because:

   a. It confirms that the Egyptian authorities have an active interest in him due to alleged political affiliations;
   b. It directly contradicts the findings of the RPD and the RAD;
   c. It corroborates his well-founded fear of persecution if he is removed to Egypt.

3. He was unable to obtain the document before the RPD and RAD hearings because:

   a. There were significant legal and bureaucratic barriers;
   b. He had no safe way of obtaining the proof while still inside Egypt;
   c. He was only able to obtain the document through his legal representatives in Egypt after the dismissal of his appeal.

4. The evidence was not available at the time of the RPD and RAD hearings through no fault of his own.

5. The RAD dismissed his appeal because of a lack of documented evidence of ongoing persecution.
6. The RAD could not have reasonably concluded this if the document had been available.

7. His previous legal counsel failed to properly explore the possibility of obtaining the evidence or advising him of its importance.
8. He has been deprived of a fair opportunity to present his case.
9. If the evidence is not admitted, he will be removed to Egypt, where there is a high likelihood of detention, mistreatment and persecution.

[6] The Applicants argue that the new evidence should be admitted because:

1. It was not available at the time of the RPD and RAD hearings;
2. It is credible and relevant;
3. It could have affected the outcome if it had been available.

[7] They also say that the RAD's refusal to consider new evidence was unreasonable and its failure to permit the introduction of this critical evidence resulted in procedural unfairness; however, this, of course, contradicts their assertion that the evidence was not available at the time of the hearings. The Applicants say that the test is set out in *Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (MCI)*, 1998 CanLII 8667 [*Cepeda-Gutierrez*] and they note that in *Tahir v. Canada (MCI)*, 2021 FC 1202, this Court found that the RAD erred by failing to properly assess new evidence. They also refer to *Mapara v. Canada (MCI)*, 2018 FC 990 [*Mapara*] for authority that procedural fairness is denied where important new evidence is excluded without justification.

[8] The Respondent submits that the new evidence does not meet any of the exceptions set out in the case law for admitting new evidence on judicial review. He points out that the

evidentiary record before the court on judicial review is generally the evidentiary record that was before the decision maker and that only three exceptions have been recognized:

1. Affidavits that provide general background information to assist the court in understanding the issues relevant to the judicial review;

2. Affidavits that bring to the court's attention procedural defects that cannot be found in the evidentiary record; for example, evidence that supports a bias argument;

3. Affidavits that highlight the complete absence of evidence before the decision-maker when it made a particular finding.

[9] The Respondent says new evidence that was not before the decision maker and goes to the merits does not fall into any of these exceptions.

[10] Further, the Respondent says that the proper authority is *Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright)*, 2012 FCA 22 [*Access Copyright*] and not *Cepeda-Gutierrez*, as the Applicants submit.

[11] The Respondent also challenges the assertion that the evidence was not available, pointing out an unexplained gap between August and November 2024 and noting that the November attempt was immediately successful in obtaining the evidence.

[12] In reply, the Applicants submit a further affidavit attempting to bolster the evidence put forward initially, which includes other evidence beyond the document from the Egyptian Court and includes psychological reports diagnosing the affiant with PTSD and witness statements. He says that this evidence directly contradicts the findings of the RAD. He also argues in the

affidavit that the Respondent takes too restrictive a view of the jurisprudence and provides additional facts about the unexplained gap between August and November.

[13] The Applicants argue that *Access Copyright* is distinguishable because it concerned a judicial review of a decision of the Copyright Board and this is fundamentally different from a refugee determination which requires a flexible and contextual approach, engages fundamental human rights and the principle of non-refoulement under international law. The Applicants assert that this more flexible approach is set out in *Cepeda-Gutierrez* and *Tahir* and should be adopted in this instance. They rely on *Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2016 FCA 96, as authority that procedural fairness considerations may justify the admission of new evidence.

[14] Rule 369(3) of the *Federal Courts Rules*, SOR/ 98-116 [*Rules*] does not permit the moving party to serve and file an affidavit in reply and leave should have been sought for the filing of the reply affidavit. The principles concerning the admission of reply evidence were discussed by the Federal Court of Appeal in *Amgen Canada Inv v. Apotex Inc*, 2016 FCA 121:

> [9] Sometimes upon the filing of a responding motion record on a motion in writing, new issues arise. Or sometimes the responding motion record causes certain issues, understandably glossed over in the moving party's motion record, to assume markedly greater importance or to be transformed.
>
> [10] In such circumstances, considerations of procedural fairness and the need to make a proper determination can require the Court to allow the filing of reply evidence in a motion in writing:
>
> • *Procedural fairness*. Sometimes a party has to be given the opportunity to file evidence on an issue that it could not practically or meaningfully address earlier.

- *The need to make a proper determination*. Where an issue in the motion might determine its outcome, sometimes the Court must allow additional evidence to be filed so that it can decide that issue on the basis of all proper and relevant facts, not just one side's version of the facts.

[11] The filing of reply evidence on a motion is permitted only in "unusual circumstances" where procedural or substantive considerations such as these are live: *Johnson & Johnson Inc. v. Boston Scientific Ltd.*, 2009 FCA 155 at para. 2. But caution must be exercised.

[12] At trial, it is a well-known rule of evidence that a plaintiff cannot split its case by adducing evidence on reply that is merely confirmatory of the case in-chief: *Allcock, Laight & Westwood Ltd. v. Patten* (1966), 1966 CanLII 282 (ON CA), [1967] 1 O.R. 18. Instead, reply evidence must relate to issues raised in the defence's case that were not raised in the plaintiff's case in-chief: *Halford v. Seed Hawk Inc.*, 2003 FCT 141 at paras. 14-15. Further, there is good reason to restrict the admission of evidence on reply. As Wigmore argued, allowing a wide range of evidence could be unfair to the respondent who had supposed the case in chief would be the entire case to meet. It could also create an unending alternation of successive fragments of the case coming forward: John Henry Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law*, revised by James H. Chadbourn (Toronto: Little, Brown and Co, 1976) v. 6 at p. 672.

[13] Much guidance can also be found in the case law that has developed under Rule 312 concerning the admission of additional affidavits in applications. Additional affidavits are permitted only where it is "in the interests of justice": *Atlantic Engraving Ltd. v. LaPointe Rosenstein*, 2002 FCA 503, 299 N.R. 244 at paras. 8-9. That means that the Court must have regard to whether:

- the evidence will assist the court (in particular, its relevance and sufficient probative value);

- admitting the evidence will cause substantial or serious prejudice to the other side;

- the evidence was available when the party filed its affidavits, or it could have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.

(*Holy Alpha & Omega Church of Toronto v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2009 FCA 101 at para. 2; *Forest Ethics Advocacy Assn. v. National Energy Board*, 2014 FCA 88 at para. 6; *House of*

> *Gwasslaam v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans)*, 2009 FCA 25, 387 N.R. 179 at para 4.) I note that this Court has applied these same factors in deciding whether a reply affidavit should be permitted to be filed in an application for leave to appeal under Rule 355, a rule that, like Rule 369(3), does not explicitly allow reply affidavits: *Quarmby v. National Energy Board of Canada*, 2015 FCA 19.

[15] The reply evidence is improper. The Applicants addressed the issue of delay in their primary submissions and cannot now bolster them because the Respondent pointed out deficiencies. This amounts to case-splitting and will not be permitted, even if leave had been sought.

[16] With respect to the main question in this motion, it is well understood that, generally, a party cannot submit new evidence on an application for judicial review. The reviewing Court is tasked with the reasonableness of the decision and whether procedural fairness has been afforded to the Applicants. Even if this Court would have come to a different conclusion than the decision-maker, so long as the decision is reasonable, this Court does not interfere. This Court only has the power to review – not redo – the decision: *Gilroy v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 FCA 302.

[17] There are three exceptions to the general rule articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal in *Sharma v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2018 FCA 48:

> […] New evidence may be admitted where (1) it provides general background in circumstances where that information might assist in understanding the issues relevant to the judicial review but does not add new evidence on the merits (2) it highlights the complete absence of evidence before the administrative decision-maker on a particular finding, or (3) it brings to the attention of the judicial review court defects that cannot be found in the

> evidentiary record of the administrative decision-maker: *Access Copyright* at para. 20; *Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2017 FCA 128; *Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2017 FCA 116. As this Court explained in *Access Copyright* at paragraph 20, "[i]n fact, many of these exceptions tend to facilitate or advance the role of the judicial review court without offending the role of the administrative decision-maker".

[18] Evidence that was not before the decision-maker and goes to the merits of the matter before the decision-maker is not admissible in an application for judicial review: *Access Copyright* at para 19. The Applicants say that *Access Copyright* is not applicable to immigration matters; however, it has frequently been applied in these types of cases; for example, in *Kaur v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* 2025 FC 430, Madam Justice Whyte Nowak applied *Access Copyright* and did not permit information going to the merits of the decision under review to be admitted on judicial review. Similarly, Justice Little also applied *Access Copyright* to find that reports that were not before the decision-maker were not admissible on the judicial review: *Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2025 FC 404.

[19] I have also considered the three exceptions to the general rule and find that none apply to the new evidence at issue. It is not general background information. It does not bring the Court's attention to procedural defects that cannot be found in the evidentiary record, as the RAD was unable to consider or fail to consider this evidence because it was not submitted. Finally, it does not highlight the complete absence of evidence before the decision-maker when it found that the Applicants would not face persecution if returned to Egypt. As this Court held in *Espitia Amador v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2024 FC 339 "[s]ubmitting new evidence … does not

serve the purpose of showing a lack of evidence" before the decision maker but is instead "an attempt to strengthen" the Applicants' position.

[20] The Applicants argue that a different test applies. They say that:

> The Federal Court has consistently held that new evidence may be admitted in judicial review proceedings where it:
>
> 1. Was not available at the time of the original hearing;
>
> 2. Is credible and relevant to the matter in dispute; and
>
> 3. Could have affected the outcome had it been considered *(Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (MCI)*, [1998] FCJ No 1425).

[21] Try as I might, I am unable to find that this is the test set out in *Cepeda-Gutierrez*. Further, *Cepeda Gutierrez* did not consider the issue of admissibility of new evidence for the first time on judicial review but, rather, the decision-maker's consideration of the evidence before it. More will be said about this later.

[22] The Applicants also rely on *Tahir v. Canada (MCI)*, 2021 FC 1202 but that was also a case where the RAD refused to admit new evidence and did not concern the admissibility of new evidence on judicial review.

[23] The Applicants' reliance on *Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2016 FCA 96, is also misplaced, as the question in that case was whether evidence that was not before the RPD could be considered by the RAD, not whether evidence that was before neither body could be considered by this Court.

[24] Having carefully considered the facts and the arguments of the parties, I conclude that the new evidence should not be admitted on the application for judicial review.

[25] With respect to the motion for an order extending the time for service and filing of the Application Record, the Applicants argue that the delay was beyond the control of the Applicants as they faced significant security risks and logistical challenges in obtaining crucial evidence from Egypt.

[26] The Applicants rely on the Affidavit of Wael Mostafa Aly Hussein which is similar to the material filed on the new evidence motion. I will not repeat the facts that are common to the two affidavits but, generally, Mr. Hussein deposes that:

1. The Respondent is not prejudiced as the delay is minimal and justified, the new evidence would allow the Court to make a fully informed decision and the Respondent still has ample time to respond;
2. This Court has discretion to extend the time limit;
3. The delay was not a lack of diligence on his part;
4. It would be unfair and unjust to deny the filing of the Application Record;
5. He has acted in good faith.

[27] The Applicants assert that the four-part test for an extension of time has been met.

[28] The Respondent argues that there is no reasonable explanation for the delay as the Applicants were, in fact, in possession of the document in issue for more than two months prior to the deadline for the Application Record. The deadline was January 27, 2025, and the Applicants came into possession of the document at the end of November. The Respondent also

says that the Applicants have not demonstrated a continuing intention to pursue his application between the initial filing on December 9, 2024, and February 14, 2025.

[29] As the same affidavit was used in reply for both motions, the comments set out above also apply to the motion to extend the time limit, so the reply affidavit will not be considered on this motion either. This includes the evidence of the Applicants' fragile mental state due to PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder.

[30] The parties agree that the correct legal test is set out in *Canada (Attorney General) v. Hennelley*, 1999 CanLII 8190 and that the interest of justice is the paramount consideration.

[31] In fact, the delay from the original deadline and the bringing of the motion is quite short and that weighs in the Applicants' favour. That said, it is not clear to me why the Application Record could not have been filed within the deadline once the document was received from the Egyptian Court. Although the Applicants did not raise this argument expressly, I am prepared to infer that the delay was to, hopefully, obtain an order admitting the new evidence. Although that is not the result, I find that it was reasonable for the Applicants to proceed as they did.

[32] The Respondent has not identified any prejudice, but it says that there was no continuing intention to pursue the Application. The Applicants say they were actively engaged in obtaining and verifying the critical evidence to support their claim.

[33] This is a difficult issue; however, having carefully considered the matter and particularly given the brief period between the filing of the motion and the missed deadline, I find that it is in the interests of justice to grant a short extension.

[34] I am faced, however, with a much more troubling issue; that is, the undeclared reliance on generative artificial intelligence. The potential for generative artificial intelligence to hallucinate is well known and this Court has issued a practice direction in regard to its use: *The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Court Proceedings* dated May 7, 2024.

[35] In reviewing the Applicants' materials, a number of authorities could not be located, and the Applicant was directed to provide the Court with a Book of Authorities. The first Book of Authorities did not contain all of the case law mentioned in the Applicants' facts and, therefore, I directed that a second and complete Book of Authorities be provided. The second Book of Authorities was similarly incomplete but, at the same time, additional authorities were included. I issued the following direction:

> *"The Court has now issued two directions requiring a Book of Authorities from the Applicant. The Court notes the continued failure to provide copies of the decisions: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Weng 2001 FCT 575 and Mapara v. Canada (MCI) 2018 FC 990 and directs the Applicant to either provide copies or an explanation as to why they are not being provided by April 4, 2025."*

[36] In response, the Applicants indicated in correspondence that five new cases were added, a typographical error was corrected and that corrected copies of the motion record and response

were also filed, each addressing a previously mis-cited case. The "mis-cited" cases were *Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Weng*, 2001 FCT 575 and *Mapara*, above.

[37] I issued yet another Direction:

> *"The Court acknowledges the correspondence from the Applicant's counsel dated 1 April 2025 in response to the direction issued on March 31, 2025. The Letter explains that two cases were replaced with other cases and describes the original cases as "mis-cited." The Court has been unable to locate the two cases (Mapara v. Canada (MCI) 2018 FC 990 and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Weng 2001 FCT 575) originally relied on by the Applicant. The Court is concerned that these cases may not exist, and the citations may have been created through the undeclared use of generative artificial intelligence. The Applicant is directed to provide copies of the cases, or if they cannot be provided, a thorough and complete explanation as to how those case citations were included in materials filed with the Court by 10 April 2025. Any use of generative artificial intelligence or other computer search tools must be disclosed."*

[38] Applicants' counsel provided further correspondence advising, for the first time, of his reliance on Visto.ai described as a professional legal research platform designed specifically for Canadian immigration and refugee law practitioners. He also indicated that he did not independently verify the citations as they were understood to reflect well established and widely accepted principles of law. In other words, the undeclared and unverified artificial intelligence had no impact, and the substantive legal argument was unaffected and supported by other cases.

[39] I do not accept that this is permissible. The use of generative artificial intelligence is increasingly common and a perfectly valid tool for counsel to use; however, in this Court, its use must be declared and as a matter of both practice, good sense and professionalism, its output must be verified by a human. The Court cannot be expected to spend time hunting for cases which do not exist or considering erroneous propositions of law.

[40] In fact, the two case hallucinations were not the full extent of the failure of the artificial intelligence product used. It also hallucinated the proper test for the admission on judicial review of evidence not before the decision-maker and cited, as authority, a case which had no bearing on the issue at all. To be clear, this was not a situation of a stray case with a variation of the established test but, rather, an approach similar to the test for new evidence on appeal. As noted above, the case relied upon in support of the wrong test (*Cepeda-Gutierrez*) has nothing to do with the issue. I note in passing that the case comprises 29 paragraphs and would take only a few minutes to review.

[41] In addition, counsel's reliance on artificial intelligence was not revealed until after the issuance of four Directions. I find that this amounts to an attempt to mislead the Court and to conceal the reliance by describing the hallucinated authorities as "mis-cited" Had the initial request for a Book of Authorities resulted in the explanation in the last letter, I may have been more sympathetic. As matters stand, I am concerned that counsel does not recognize the seriousness of the issue.

[42] Costs are not ordinarily awarded by this Court in the context of immigration proceedings. As Justice Rochester said in *Diakite v. Canada*, 2024 FC 170:

> Rule 22 of the *Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules,* SOR/93-22 [IRPR] provides:
>
> | **Costs** | **Dépens** |
> | --- | --- |
> | **22** No costs shall be awarded to or payable by any party in respect of an application for leave, an application for judicial review or an appeal under these Rules unless the | **22** Sauf ordonnance contraire rendue par un juge pour des raisons spéciales, la demande d'autorisation, la demande de contrôle judiciaire ou l'appel introduit en application des |

Court, for special reasons, so orders.	présentes règles ne donnent pas lieu à des dépens.

[58] The term “special reasons” is not defined in the IRPR nor is there a set definition in the jurisprudence (*Lesi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2016 FC 441 at para 48 [*Lesi*]; *Ndungu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2011 FCA 208 at para 6). The threshold for establishing such circumstances is high, and each decision will turn on its own particular circumstances (*Dhaliwal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2011 FC 201 at para 30 [*Dhaliwal*]; *Ibrahim v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2007 FC 1342 at para 8; *Balepo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2017 FC 1104 at para 38). This Court has found “special reasons” to exist where a party acts in a manner that may be characterized as unfair, oppressive, improper or actuated by bad faith (*Dhaliwal* at para 31). This is also the case where there has been reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct on the part of a party (*Toure* at para 16).

[59] I note that strictly speaking, Rule 22 of the IRPR refers to an application for leave, an application for judicial review, or an appeal under the IRPR. Before me is a motion. Nevertheless, I find myself guided by Rule 22 and find that “special reasons” exist in the present case. A finding that “special reasons” for an award of costs exists triggers the Court’s discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs under Rule 400 of the *Federal Courts Rules* (*Lesi* at para 48; *Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2014 FC 1002 at paras 64-65).

[60] The Court has broad discretion over costs. Subsection 400(1) of the *Rules* provides that the Court has full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs and by whom they are to be paid. The threefold objective of costs is, first, providing compensation, second, promoting settlement, and third, deterring abusive behaviour (*Air Canada v. Thibodeau*, 2007 FCA 115 at para 24; *Allergan Inc v. Sandoz Canada Inc*, 2021 FC 186 at para 19 [*Allergan*]). When exercising its discretion to award costs, the principal factors that the Court may consider are set out in a non-exhaustive list in subsection 400(3) of the *Rules* (*Allergan* at para 29).The list includes whether the conduct of any party tended to unnecessarily lengthen the duration of the proceeding; whether any step was improper, vexatious, unnecessary; or taken through negligence, mistake or excessive caution (Rule 400(3)(i) and (k)).

Pursuant to subsection 400(4), the Court may award a lump sum in lieu of, or in addition to, any assessed costs.

[61] Section 404 of the *Rules* permits the Court to award costs against counsel personally where:

Liability of solicitor for costs	**Responsabilité de l'avocat**
404 (1) Where costs in a proceeding are incurred improperly or without reasonable cause or are wasted by undue delay or other misconduct or default, the Court may make an order against any solicitor whom it considers to be responsible, whether personally or through a servant or agent,	**404 (1)** Lorsque, dans une instance, des frais ont été engagés abusivement ou sans raison valable ou que des frais ont été occasionnés du fait d'un retard injustifié ou de quelque autre inconduite ou manquement, la Cour peut rendre l'une des ordonnances suivantes contre l'avocat qu'elle considère comme responsable, qu'il s'agisse de responsabilité personnelle ou de responsabilité du fait de ses préposés ou mandataires :
(a) directing the solicitor personally pay the costs of a party to the proceeding; or	**a)** une ordonnance enjoignant à l'avocat de payer lui-même les dépens de toute partie à l'instance;
(b) disallowing the costs between the solicitor and the solicitor's client.	**b)** une ordonnance refusant d'accorder les dépens entre l'avocat et son client.

[62] No order of costs shall, however, be made against counsel personally unless counsel has been given an opportunity to be heard.

[43] I find that the use of generative artificial intelligence not only undeclared but, frankly, concealed from the Court combined with the failure to verify the content amounts to special reasons warranting an award of costs on this motion. I further find that consideration should be

given as to whether it would be appropriate to direct Applicants' counsel to pay any costs awarded on the motion personally. Applicants' counsel will be afforded an opportunity to be heard on this specific issue.

THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1. The motion for the admission of new evidence in the form of the following documents is dismissed:

    a) A certified document from an Egyptian court confirming an ongoing investigation into one of the Applicants; and

    b) An affidavit explaining why the document was not available at the time of the proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) and the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD).

2. The motion for an extension of time to file the Application Record is granted and the Applicants shall have ten (10) days from the date of this Order to serve and file their Application Record.

3. Regarding the quantum of costs for this motion and whether it would be appropriate to direct the Applicants' counsel pay any costs awarded on this motion personally ["Cost Issue"]:

a) Applicants' counsel shall serve and file any written submissions on the Costs Issue within 10 days of this Order and, if Applicants' counsel wishes to be heard orally, that shall be indicated in the submissions;

b) The Respondent shall serve and file any responding submissions on the Costs Issue within 5 days of service of the Applicants' submissions; and,

c) Applicants' counsel may serve and file any reply submissions on the Costs Issue within 5 days of service of the Respondent's submissions.

"Catharine Moore"
Associate Judge

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-23001-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:	WAEL MOSTAFA ALY HUSSEIN ET AL. v. THE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP
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DATE OF HEARING:	MOTION IN WRITING
ORDER AND REASONS:	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MOORE
DATED:	APRIL 28, 2025

SUBMISSIONS IN WRITNG BY:

Jonathan Richard Lage	FOR THE APPLICANT
Blake Van Santen	FOR THE RESPONDENT

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